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Toward Automated Abstraction for Protocols on
Branching Networks
Michael Jones, Ganesh Gopalakrishnan
School of Computing, University of Utah
mjones,ganesh@cs.utah.edu
Abstract- We have used various manual abstraction techniques to formally verify a transaction ordering property for
an IO protocol over bus/bridge networks. In the context
of network protocol verification, an abstraction is needed
to reduce the unbounded number of network configurations
to a small number of representative networks that can be
checked using algorithmic methods. The manually derived
abstraction was both brittle and difficult to validate. In this
report, we discuss the need for abstraction techniques in the
formal verification of protocols over networks and present
our recent efforts to create an automatic abstraction technique for network protocols using predicate abstraction as
a starting point.
Keywords- Formal verification methods, parameterized
systems, predicate abstraction

We address the problem of abstraction in the formal verification of safety properties at the bus/bridge level for protocols defined over acyclic branching networks. Abstraction is needed in this context because formal methods applied directly to protocols over networks are either not applicable, or at best difficult and time-consuming. The main
source of difficulty is the unbounded nature of branching
networks. Because there are an unbounded number of configurations that must be checked, tt is not possible to apply
algorithmic methods, such as model checking, to all possible network configurations. We have found [MHJGOO]
that it is prohibitively difficult to apply interactive theorem
proving in the context of protocols on branching networks.
In this report, we discuss our recent efforts to increase the
amount of automation available for creating and reasoning
about abstractions of protocols defined over branching networks. The problem with manually derived abstractions is
that they need to be validated. Validating an abstraction
is the process of showing which properties are preserved by
the abstract model. We have found [JGOO] that building
a validation proof for a manually derived abstraction for
protocols over networks is also difficult.
The significanceof this work is that it will provide a technique for creating abstractions of protocols over branching
networks such that certain properties of the protocol can be
checked with minimal manual effort. The novel feature of
this work is a predicate abstraction technique suitable for
use on protocols which are defined over networks in which
the states and connectivity of intermediate nodes affect the
property being checked.
We begin by reviewing relevant results from predicate abstraction and parameterized system verification. Section I1
contains a detailed presentation of the abstraction scheme.
The formal presentation in section I1 is closely patterned
after the presentation in [GS97]. Section 111 gives an ex-

ample, and we close with our thoughts on abstractions for
networks in the final section.
I. RELATED
WORK
The ideas presented here are an extension of predicate
abstraction as described in [GS97]. Predicate abstraction is
a form of abstraction in which the reduction is constructed
manually but the validation and checking tasks are automated. To create a predicate abstraction, the user specifies
a set of predicates which are used to divide the abstract
state space depending on the truth , or falsity, of the predicates. Given the predicates, an abstract transition relation
is constructed such that the original infinite state model is
a refinement of the abstract finite state model. In practice,
predicate abstraction requires several rounds of verification
in which the user adds invariants to eliminate false negatives between rounds. The PVS theorem prover contains
support for predicate abstraction and invariant strengthening [SS99]. Predicate abstraction has been applied to
limited forms of networks [LS97] in which the particular
shape of the network is unimportant t o the property being verified. A form of predicate abstraction using BDDs
to represent sets of reachable states has been implemented
using the Murd, model checker [DDP99]. It is difficult to
apply predicate abstraction to parameterized systems due
to the quantification required to describe arrays of processes. Quantification makes predicate abstraction difficult
because determining if a transition is enabled for a state
description containing quantification is either undecidable
or requires a complex decision procedure. We address the
quantification problem by introducing a second variable for
each predicate that encodes whether or not a node exists
in the array that satisfies the predicate.
The proposed abstraction scheme applies to branching
parameterized systems. While the verification problem for
parameterized systems is in general undecidable [.4K86],
methods for reasoning about limited classes of protocols
and properties have been developed. Other methods for
reasoning about parameterized systems are based on regular expressions [KMM+97], [SG89], [CGJ95], rather than
abstract state variables. While regular expression based
techniques have found success primarily in linear or ring
shaped topologies (see [BJNTOO],[PSOO]for recent results),
the early papers consider extensions t o include reasoning
about branching topologies. Despite the ability of regular expression representations to describe and reason about
branching topologies, no results for complex protocols have
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yet appeared in the literature. By using a different representation and abstraction scheme over a limited class
of properties, we hope to derive an abstraction scheme
that can be applied to larger examples such as commercial multi-bus IO protocols. The added restriction in our
work is that we consider only safety properties defined over
a constant number of terminal nodes rather than safety
properties in general.

I,? = asgnXi, the j t h initial state for process i in which

each variable in X i is assigned a value.
Both the guard and the assignment in each transition take
the routing table and network state as parameters. Including the network state and routing tables as parameters allows the guard and assignment to access the states of other
nodes. For example, the guard in transition rj can use the
state of an adjacent node to determine if 7; is enabled. Similarly, the presence of the routing table and network work
11. PREDICATE ABSTRACTION FOR NETWORKS
state in the update expression allows the transition at a
The idea behind the abstraction scheme is project the node to modify the states of other nodes in the network.
subnetwork containing the terminal nodes in the property Transitions need to modify the state of adjacent nodes if
being checked then model the state of each network seg- the transition moves a message between two nodes.
We now define the semantics of a network of processes
ment using a variant of predicate abstraction. The variant
of predicate abstraction uses an additional boolean vari- over a state graph.
Definition 3: Parameterized State Graph. Given a netable for each predicate to indicate whether or not a node
exists which satisfies the predicate represented by the state work of processes: and a routing table R, the parameterized
variable. The additional existence variable is used to en- state graph, S“ is a three-tuple, (QR,PR,
. I .R ) where
code quantification which is required to model parameterQ R = x:,xi.. .xi,x:, X; . ..xi...xi,xi...X:
ized systems using predicate abstraction. In the remainder
P R = u~=,(u~=lrf(q)
where
of this section we formally define the model of computaif g:(q, R , X ) = F
tion and abstraction scheme. The next section contains
‘f(q) = {l
asgn;(q, R,X ) otherwise
an example of the abstraction scheme applied to a trivial
0 IR = {qlinit(q)}
property on a simplified version of the PCI protocol
In
the definition of S R , QR is a graph node representing
A network of processes is created by instantiating a parameterized finite state protocol p a at each node. -4routing a global network state, P R represents the transitions enabled for a graph node and I R is the set of initial states.
table defines the connectivity in the network.
Definztzon 1. Network of nodes. A network of nodes is a The entire state graph, S , for a protocol defined over a
network of processes is created by taking the union of all
six-tuple ( N ,A, R, X , T ,13) where:
state graphs over all routing tables. For networks with unN = 1...n, a list of node indices.
boundedly large network topologies, S contains a finite but
A C N , a list of agent, or terminal, nodes.
unbounded number of states. Since the unboundedness of
R = { ( A a-,4,,n1,n2 . . .n,)l for agents A,, A, in A}, a S stems from the unbounded number of unique valid routrouting table in which agent A, is connected to agent ing tables, the crux of the abstraction is creating a model
A, by the path through nodes n1 through 12%.
which contains a bounded number of network topologies
-‘z = XI,
X 2 .. .X,, the network state formed by takand using predicate abstraction to model the unbounded
ing the state of each node, X,.
number of states in each topology. Each topology has an
T = T l ,T2 . . .Tn,the set of network transitions formed unbounded number of states because there may be an unby the transitions, T,, from p , at each node.
bounded number of nodes in each edge of a given network
I , = I:, I; . . .I;, the j t h initial network state formed topology.
by taking the initial state of each node, I:.
We now define the abstraction of a state graph given the
The first three elements of a network, N , A, R, define the abstraction of a routing table. This part of the abstracglobal network structure. N and A define the interior and tion uses predicate abstraction to represent the unbounded
exterior nodes of the network while R defines the connec- number of states in a topology. The abstraction of routing
tions between exterior nodes using paths of interior nodes. tables will be discussed later. We begin with preliminary
The latter three elements, X , T ,13, define the state and definitions and results for predicate transformers.
transition relation of the network in a per-process fashion.
Definition 4: Strongest Postcondition. For a parameterEach of X , T ,I3 are defined using the state, transitions and ized transition rr and a set of states characterized by a
initial state of each node. The state, transitions and ini- predicate cp, the strongest postcondition of cp by rp is detial state of each node are all parameterized definitions, as fined as:
given next.
POSt[7inl(P) = 37’.rin(q‘, 4 ) A d 4 ’ )
Definztzon 2: Parameterized Protocol. A finite state paDefinition 5: Weakest Precondition. For a parameterrameterized protocol, p , is a triple ( X , , T,, I,) where
ized transition r? and a set of states characterized by a
X , = xi : t l , xi : t 2 . . .xX : tk, a list of declarations in predicate cp, the weakest precondition of cp by 7: is defined
which each variable xcj at node i has type t,.
as:
T, = T;,ri . . .
a list of transitions for process I,
F[7inI((P)= Vq’.qYq, 9’)
(P(4’)
is the smallest set of successors of cp
in which each 7;” has the form r; = g,(z, R, X) ct Intuitively, post[rF]((p)
reachable by rp and jKG[rp](cp)is the largest set of states
asgn(i,R, X ) .

*

TL,
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that map to cp by r,". As reported in [GS97],we can rewrite
as

Eb3 (9)and POSt[T,"I(cp)

E[.r,nl(P) =
( g : ( 4 =+ cF:[wn:(n, R, W l ( n ,R , X)l)

*

*

represent all possible network configurations. If we restrict
the set of invariants to safety properties over a constant
number of terminal nodes, then we can enumerate all possible (up to path length) acyclic configurations, R,, on
n terminal nodes. The class R, of networks corresponds
to the class of unique Steiner topologies over n terminals
where each terminal has degree one (see [HRS%'92]for a discussion of Steiner topologies). This correspondence gives
an upper-bound on the number of unique acyclic network
configurations over n nodes.
Given a concrete routing table R, we construct a corresponding abstract routing table R' by first labeling n of the
terminal nodes (as required to check a property on n terminal nodes). The abstract routing table R' is then created
by projecting only the n labeled nodes and the paths between them. The final step is to replace the nodes in each
unique path segment between the n labeled nodes with a
single path variable. An example of creating an abstract
routing table can be found in Section 111. An important
property of the routing table abstraction is that all networks with the same topology on the n labeled nodes are
reduced to the same abstract routing table.
Given an abstract routing table R' E R, we construct
the concretization of RI, y(R'),as follows. The set R, =
r ( R ' )is thc set of concrete routing tables such that:

post[CI(cp) P'iff cp E[7,nI(cp')
Definztzon 6: Abstract State Graph. Given a state graph
S R = ( Q R , U ; . I n ) for a network of nodes and routing
table R with abstracted routing table RI (as will be defined
later), let QZ' be a lattice of abstract states with 5'2' =
( Q ~ ' , U ~ , I "and
' ) ( a : 2QR cs QZ',yQf' c) 2QR).Then
Sf is an abstraction of S R iff
I R C y(If), and
Vn.Vi.VqA E QZ'.
path(n) ( q A ) )
Post[T,"l(?'(qA))
y(.f,
R G y(R')
Intuitively, 5'2' is an abstraction of S R if for every transition at every node in S R , the strongest postcondition of the
concrete states in 'y(qA) is a subset of the concrete states in
'y(,i,p"th'n'(qA)). In short, for every move T at every node
in S R , there is a move ? in Sz' that does as much or more
than 7.
Next we identify an abstraction scheme for S R . We conEvery terminal node t , in R' also appears in every R,.
sider the abstract state lattice 0,"'
induced by the predIf R ' ( i , j ) = pl ...p,,
then R ( i , j ) = y(p1) ...y(p,)
icates cp,; cp,; . . . cp: parameterized by each node n. For
where y(p) is the smallest set of nodes that appears in
each predicate in 9%and abstract path j in R' we define
every entry of R which corresponds to an entry in R'
two abstract state variables ai@:.
containing p .
Definztzon 7: Abstract state lattice. Given the set of
monomials over 19: and 8 for an abstract routing table More formally, we define y(R') as
R' and glb operator A (boolean conjunction) with lub opDefinztzon 8: Concretization of a Routing Table. The
erator (weakened form of disjuction), the abstract state concretization of a routing table R' is
lattice 6fR' is defined to be ( f i ,A, U)
{ R I t , E R' + t, E RA
Each monomial in MR' represents a set of concrete states
R'(i,j)= ~ i . . . ~ r n R ( i , j )= y ( ~ ~ ) . . . y ( ~ m ) }
described by a conjunction of quantified predicates as given where y ( p ) = {ni ...nmlVk,Z.p E R'(k,l) + n1 ...nm E
in Figure 1. As shown in the figure, an abstract monoR ( k 0)
mial represents the set of concrete states which contain
sequences of nodes that may contain a node that satisfies
111. TUTORIAL
EXAMPLE
a predicates (P, depending on the values of i$i and I9; in
the monomial.
We give a simple example of checking a property on a
We now define the abstract transition relations parame- simplified version of the PCI protocol [PC195], called PCI,,
terized by paths using monomials over abstract state vari- including only posted messages. In PCI, a posted message
ables. For a given abstract state 7F1 we compute the ab- is an unacknowledged message which can be neither deleted
stract transition ?," corresponding to transition 7," for some nor reordered. The property we wish to check is: "if two
n E IC using the equation shown in Figure 2. The equation agents send a posted message to a single destination, then
states that the next state of ?: ( f i )is F if 'y(7jz) always fails one of the messages always reaches the destination first."
t o satisfy the guard for transition r: for any n E k ; but that The property is not true for PCI, so we expect to find a
( m ) includes any disjunction over
8f-+!, ~ 8 f @ fviolation.
and
for next states that may or may not have
There is only one topologically unique way to connect
nodes in path k that may or may not satisfy cp;.
Note three nodes in an acyclic network, so there is only one abthat each (y(7E1) A 9:) + ~cp,"[asgn:(3?)/3?]is simply the stract routing table to consider in the construction of the
quantifier free form of p o s t [ r ; ] ( y ( h ) ) + p,".
abstract state graph. Although all networks over three terAs mentioned before, the crux of the abstraction is re- minal nodes have the same abstraction, we provide an exducing the potentially unbounded number of routing tables ample of constructing the abstract routing table. Suppose
over an unbounded set of terminal and non-terminal nodes we have a PCI, network containing three terminal nodes
to a bounded number of small abstract routing tables that with the following routing table:

*
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Fig. 1. Sets of concrete states represented by a monomial over the abstract state variables.

.ii"(m) =

Fig. 2. Computing the abstract transition relation for a concrete transition

T:

The property we want to check asserts that the message
from agent 1 t o agent 3 arrives at agent 3 first. This is
property is expressed by the following predicate:
9,8,12,11

cph = ( i = 3) 3 a2.q[O]
= ((1,3) V empty)

We chose t o mark nodes 1,2 and 3 as the terminal nodes
in the property being checked; that means that node 10 will
be eliminated in the abstraction. After eliminating terminal node 10, we replace the nodes in each non-branching
sub-path in the remaining network with a single path. For
example, all paths to and from node 1 include nodes 4 and
5 . This means that nodes 4 and 5 form a non-branching
sub-path, which we represent as path A in the abstract
routing table. Note that the abstract routing table RI is
defined such that R C y ( R ' ) :

We use cpb and the additional predicates
cp; = g; = X,.q[O] =

(123) A next(i, 3) # 3 A lfull(xnext(,,a)
cp; = g; = X,.q[O] =
(273) A next(i, 3) # 3 A l f ~ l l ( X n e x t ( a , 3 ~
to define the abstract state space. Given the initial state 11
and the predicates yb, cp;, 9; we have the following initial
abstract state:

il =

-+@",

18fl@Af4F1@,"
Y1 lflP@P

' A - A -,dB - B

l^Y1

17Y;+;

1

6f@? '6g@

The initial abstract state represents all concrete states
A PCI, message is written as a tuple ( s , d ) which indiwhich contain message (1,3) in path A and message (2,3)
cates a message from agent s to agent d. We begin with
in path B.
the definition of the state and transitions at a PCI, node,
We compute the next states for f1 under the transitions
parameterized by node address i.
7-i
and r;. We begin with .i;'.First, we check
X,= q:Array[2] of PCI, message, opposite-q: Array[2]
of PCI, message.
y(f1) Vn E A.lgF
Transition r: with
that the concretization of the abstract initial state does not
g; = X,.q[O]= (1,3)A next(i, 3) # 3 A
satisfy g r for every node n in ?(A). We check the negated
lf~11(Xnext~a,3)
.q)
form of the previous equation:
asgn; = delete(0,i);append((l,3),next(i, 3))
Transition 7-l with
~ ( f i )=+ 3n E A . g r
g; = Xz.q[O]= (2,3) A next(i, 3) # 3A
Since f l includes 8t@fwe have that 3n E A.pT and from
+WXnext(,,3) .q)
the definition of cp? we have
asgn; = delete(0, i); append((l,3),next(i, 3))
1; with d . q [ O ] = (1,3), s2.q[O]= (2,3) and s J . q [ k ]=
3n E A.gF =+ 3n E A.g;
empty for every other j , k.
Each node contains two arrays which each contain a max- which is trivially true. This gives us that
# F and
imum of two messages. Transition 7-i moves message (1,3) we compute the values of the state variables for the other
from node a to the next node on the path from i to agent predicates and network paths. We compute the effects of
3-if the queue in the next node is not full. Similarly, tranby considering the effects of applying rr to any node
sition r: moves message (2,3) to the next node on the path n in the concretization of A. We present in detail how the
from i to agent 3.
values of 8f@fare computed and summarize the values

+

:+

+!
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for the other state var!ables.
First, we check if Sf@ should be added to the next
state of ?:(fl). We add 8f@fif

3n E A.3m E A. (y(f1) A 9:)

+ cpy[asgn;(Z)/%]

It is possible to pick a node n in ?(A) such that p;". Suppose n is not the last node in y(A) and m is the next node
after n in y(A), then asgnF(5) moves PI from node n to
node m. In this case, if node m is empty before appending
PI then cp? is true of m after asgnF(Z)/%.
Next, we check if 8f-yf should be added to the next
state of ?f(il).
We add 19f+f if
377. E A.3m E A . ( y ( f ~ A
) g:

For predicate

9 2 , ?,"(f1) has no effect on cp2 either.
This is because [asgnF(Z)/%]does not affect message
(2,3). While [asgn;(%)/%]does move message (1,3),
the location of message (2,3) has no bearing on the
value of p2.
This concludes the computation of ff(f1). We have that
( f 1 ) includes the following boolean expression over the
abstract state variables:

?e

ff(f1)

AT ~ ~ T @ ~

(8t@fV 8fi@fV -8fGf)A
8p-@f V 18fGf')A

a$@$A i8$&

Which is also true. If we pick n and m to be the same node
in ?.(A), then after [asyn?(Z)/%]PI is no longer in m so
3m E A.~(p;"[asgn;(3!/%]
and we add 8f+f to .i,"(fl).
Now we check if -8f@qshould be added to the next
We add +f@;' if
state of ?f(fl).

Next, we perform the same analysis for

?y(fl)

and

?f(fl). We begin by checking that
y(f1) 3 V n E B.-g; and

y(f1)

* Vn E C.ig:

Both of these implications are true because i@
and
@?
~ 8 ? @are
f in 1 1 . For
we then have that

+y(fl),

+~~?[US~TL;(%)/%]

Which is true if we pick n t o be the last node in ? ( A ) .
In this case, [asgnF(%)/%]
moves PIout of the last node in
y(A) so that 4 m E A.cp;"[asgn;(%)/Z].So we add 18f+f
to ?f(il).
Finally, we check if 18fl@fshould be added to the next
state of f,"(fl).We add i8fi$f if

3n E -4.13m E A.(y(il) Agy

~ d t ~ A$-8fi@f
t
idF@fA
(8F@fV
~8,"@,"
A

+ -p;"[asgn;(%)/%]

37~E .4.-3m E A.(y(Il) A 9:

=

+ -yy[asgn;(%)/%]

Which is not true because PI is in at most one node in ?(A)
and PI is in different nodes
before and after [asgnF(%)/%]
before and after the transition. Consequently, PI can not
be in all nodes of ? ( A ) after the transition.
We now have that 8f@f',@+f and -8pp;" are in
?:(il). We have now computed the values of 8 1 and $1
for path A. We next perform a similar analysis for paths B
and C
For path B, only -8F@F is in ?t(fl). This is because
[asgn;(%)/%]can not move message (1,3) to a bridge
in path B sirice riext(i,3) is never a bridge in B for all
bridges i in path ,4.
For path C, we find that the following terms for 7-1" are
8f'l@fand 18FGf. These terms
in Ft(f1): 8f'@f',
can, but is not reare included because [asgn;(%)/%]
quired to, move message (1,3) to a bridge in path C
from a bridge in path A.
Next, we need to determine which state variables for predicates po and p2 fo,r bridges in paths A, B and C need to
be included in ??(Il).
For predicate cpo, F e ( f 1 ) has no effect on cpo because
[asgn;(%)/%]
can not violate the invariant. Suppose
[asgn;(Z)/s] moves (1,3) into the head of agent 3.
Then if pi was true before [asgn?(%)/%]
then cp; is still
does
true after [asgn;(%)/Z]. Suppose [asgnF(%)/%]
not move (1.3) into the head of agent 3. Similarly, if
pz was true before [asgnF(3)/%]
then pz is still true
after [asgny(%)/%J.

-3m E B.qY A y(f1)

+ Vn E C.lgr

and cp? = 9;". Because no nodes in paths B and C satisfy
the guard on T~ in state il, both ?,"(fl) and ? f ( j 1 ) equal

F.
Having determined the abstraction of all possible effects
on all network nodes of all concrete states represented
of qA
by 11, we now analyze the effects of r2 on all nodes in
all states represented by 11. The effects of 7-2 are similar
to the effects of 7 1 except r2 moves message (2,3) rather
than message (1,3). We will compute the next state set
for ??(fl) and find a violation of the invariant. To make
the example complete, we first check that the transition in
enabled by attempting to disprove
$12)

+ Vn E B.-g;

Since 8,"@,"is in

f1,

we have that

3m E B.& A y ( & )

3

Vn E B.lg,"

which is false since cp2 = g2. Since ?,"(il)
is enabled, we
next computeAwhichabstract state variables are in the next
state for ??(I1),
We will start with 8$&' because it will yield a violation
in the next state
of the form 8:7@g. To include
of f.f(il) we need to prove that

dg-~@t

3n E B.3m E C.(y(Ii)A g; =+ ~ c p ~ [ ~ ~ g $ ( % ) / P ]
If we pick n t o be the last bridge in B and let m be bridge 3
in path C (implying that C has only one bridge, which is an
acceptable assumption) then [asgna(%)/%]
moves message
(2,3) into the head of the queue in m. Bridge m now
violates
x3.q[o]= (2,3) A (i = 3)

+ xz.q[O]= ((1,3) V empty)

so we add 8$-@gto ?F(il) and find that a node exists in
path C which violates 90.
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Predicate abstraction is conservative, rather than exact,
so this violation does not necessarily imply that a violation
exists in the concrete model. However, in this case, the
violation can be translated into a violating trace. The violating PCI, trace allows the message (2,3) to reach agent
3 before the message (1,3).
IV. CONCLUDING
REMARKS
By restricting the class of properties that can be checked
and using a representation based on predicate abstraction,
we have created an abstraction method which is intended to
extend parameterized system verification to complex protocols over branching networks. At present, our predicate
abstraction technique for networks exists only as “paperware.” That is, predicate abstraction for networks has been
worked out on paper and pencil, and paper examples have
been completed; but that we have not yet built a tool which
incorporates these techniques and applies them systematically.
Before building a tool based on these ideas, we plan to
extend the paper-ware version to include other network
classes, apply to distributed shared memory systems and
provide conservative support for reasoning about VCTL*
properties. We anticipate that the most difficult aspect
of the implementation will be providing reasoning support
for deciding if the set of concrete states represented by a
monomial of abstract state variables satisfies a guard to a
transition
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